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NOTE




Empirical studies of employment discrimination litigation have
steadily increased in number since the early 1990s.' Although this in-
crease is largely due to the greater availability of statistical software
packages for personal computers and comprehensive data sets from
state and federal courts, the realization that such litigation constitutes
a significant part of the federal docket has almost certainly provoked
further research. 2 Initially, researchers and commentators were
mostly concerned about whether the increasing volume of employ-
ment discrimination litigation created an undue burden on federal
courts.3 More recently, concern has shifted to the ability of employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs to obtain favorable outcomes in court
and through settlement. 4
Investigations of the success rate of employment discrimination
plaintiffs face two primary challenges: obtaining accurate data and de-
fining success. The first challenge is primarily practical; the second
challenge is primarily conceptual. Accurate data is available to the
t B.A., Oberlin College, 2006; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2011; Managing Editor, Cor-
nell Law Review, Volume 96. I am thankful for the incomparable assistance of the following
members of the Cornell Law Review: Jennifer Greene, Nicholas Menillo, Lilian Balasanian,
and the Senior Officers of Volume 96. I am particularly indebted to Professor Theodore
Eisenberg for tirelessly answering my questions about how to code unusual case outcomes.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Charlie and Joan Brown, for their love and sup-
port throughout law school.
I See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EmracAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004); Kevin M. Clermont,
Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 547 (2003); John J. Donohue III &
Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 983 (1991); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 663,
2 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1, at 983-84.
3 See id.
4 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
in Federal Court: From Bad to Wome?, 3 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 103, 103 (2009). Although the
focus of empirical research has shifted to the ability of employment discrimination plain-
tiffs to achieve successful outcomes, the debate surrounding the volume of employment
discrimination litigation continues. See, e.g., Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 666.
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interested researcher, but collecting a sufficient sample can be a diffi-
cult and time-consuming task.5 The challenge of defining success,
however, is primarily a challenge of defining settlement.
Settlement is the most common successful outcome for plain-
tiffs,6 but definitions of settlement vary considerably from study to
study. Any researcher interested in plaintiff success rates must be
careful to ensure that the final dispositions coded as settlements re-
flect plaintiff victories and not merely nonadjudicated terminations,
i.e. cases resolved in any form other than a contested judgment. This
requires articulating exactly which final dispositions to include in
both the numerator and the denominator of the settlement rate.
This empirical study aims to broaden and deepen our under-
standing of employment discrimination litigation. It broadens our
understanding by replicating, in a different federal district, Theodore
Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers's 2009 study (Eisenberg-Lanvers
study), which established a framework for measuring the settlement
rate as a proxy for plaintiff success and explored settlement rates for a
variety of types of litigation.7 By replicating the Eisenberg-Lanvers
study in the narrower context of employment discrimination in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, this study
demonstrates the degree to which settlement rates by type of litiga-
tion-for example, tort, contract, or employment discrimination-
can vary within and across districts. This study deepens our under-
standing by examining the demographic features of employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs and investigating plaintiffs' ability to achieve
successful outcomes before different judges.
Part I of this Note discusses the latest empirical research on em-
ployment discrimination litigation in federal court. This research
uses the sociolegal concept of the pyramid of disputes to explore em-
ployment discrimination litigation as a claiming system and identifies
some of the unique challenges employment discrimination plaintiffs
face in their place of employment, before the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), and in federal court. Part II of this
Note examines different definitions of settlement and the relative ad-
vantages of data obtained from the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts (AO) and Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER).
This Part draws heavily from the Eisenberg-Lanvers study and contex-
5 Although data collection for this type of study can be time-consuming, a single
researcher can now feasibly accomplish it. Before the Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (PACER) system and its state-court counterparts, this modest study would have
required a team of research assistants to visit separate courthouses and physically inspect
case records.
6 See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112-13 (2009).
7 See id. at 111.
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tualizes the data and methods that it employed. Part III describes the
data I collected, their source, and the coding decisions I made. It lists
all of the final disposition codes and their respective frequencies. Part
IV summarizes the results of the empirical analysis and presents rele-
vant statistics in tables. It provides several alternative methods of cal-
culating the settlement rate and explores differences in the settlement
rate by case category and type of employment discrimination alleged.
Part V discusses how this study both corroborates and alters our un-
derstanding of employment discrimination litigation with particular
reference to the research discussed in Part I. Finally, I summarize the
most significant conclusions that I draw from my research and note
the need for further research to explain interdistrict differences.
I
PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION
Research into employment discrimination litigation began to in-
tensify in the early 1990s as such litigation began to account for an
increasingly large part of the federal docket.8 Employment discrimi-
nation cases rose as a percentage of the federal docket until reaching
a peak of about 10% in 2001.9 Since then, this category of litigation
has dropped both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the
federal docket.' 0 Currently, it accounts for roughly 6% of the federal
docket, behind only two other categories of litigation: product liability
cases and habeas corpus petitions."
Laura Beth Nielsen and Robert Nelson, writing around the time
that the volume of federal employment discrimination litigation
peaked, make some additional observations about the character of
these cases. They note that the variety of employment discrimination
cases has increased across multiple dimensions. 12 Federal protection
of employee civil rights now covers more discriminatory practices, in-
cluding sexual harassment,' 3 and also recognizes claims of discrimina-
tion based on other characteristics such as disability.14 The Family
and Medical Leave Act provides additional protections for employees
who become pregnant or sick or who have to care for a family mem-
8 See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 1, at 983-84.
9 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 103-04; Clermont & Schwab, supra note 1,
at 429.
10 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 104.
11 Id.
12 See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 666.
13 SeeMeritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("[I n 1980 the EEOC
issued Guidelines specifying that 'sexual harassment,' as there defined, is a form of sex
discrimination prohibited by Title VII.").
14 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
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ber with a serious medical condition.15 By the late 1990s, claims based
on age' 6 and disability began to make up a large portion of federal
employment discrimination claims.17
As statutory protection of employee civil rights expanded, how-
ever, the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts shortened the
reach of employment discriminations laws.' 8 The Court's decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio19 made it more difficult for plaintiffs
to allege discriminatory impact claims in two ways. First, it required
plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular practice or set of practices
created the disparity, and second, it relaxed the "business necessity"
standard by which a defendant could rebut the plaintiffs prima facie
case.2 0 In twin decisions, the Court also placed state employees
outside of the aegis of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act21
and the Americans with Disabilities Act.2 2 Finally, in Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, the Court articulated an affirmative defense for employers
whose employees engaged in sexual harassment that creates a hostile
work environment: the Court allowed the employers to avoid liability
by demonstrating that they had exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct sexual harassment and that the victim failed to use the
employer's preventative or corrective measures.23 Lower courts have
construed this defense as a safe harbor, and employers that institute
antiharassment policies incorporating a complaint mechanism are vir-
tually immune from liability-even, in some cases, where the plaintiff
does use the employer's complaint procedures.24
15 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
16 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
17 SeeJohn J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Evolution of Employment Discrimina-
tion Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary Empirical Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 261, 273 tbl.4 (Laura Beth Nielson &
Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005).
18 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 675.
19 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
20 See id. at 658-60 (requiring that the employer demonstrate a business justification,
rather than a business necessity, for the challenged practice). The Civil Rights Act of 1991
partially superseded this decision by returning to a stricter standard of business necessity,
but the stricter standard still requires plaintiffs to allege that specific employment practices
of the defendant have a discriminatory impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
21 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67 (2000).
22 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
23 See 524U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (articulating the affirmative defense and finding as
a matter of law that the city did not exercise reasonable care to prevent the harassing
conduct of an employee's supervisors).
24 E.g., Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 267 (5th Cir. 1999); see also
John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the Disappearance of "Vicarious" Liability: The Emergence of a
Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile
Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1401, 1422-37 (2002) ("[Lower] courts
have effectively construed the defense as providing a summary judgment safe harbor
against claims of supervisor harassment."). But see David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & ZevJ.
Eigen, Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800" Harassment Hotline: An Empirical
[Vol. 96:12471250
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Underlying this legislative and judicial activity is a debate about
whether there are too many or too few claims. 25 Members of the em-
ployment defense bar and conservative commentators have argued
that antidiscrimination statutes have created windfalls for plaintiffs. 2 6
Alternatively, social scientists argue that the failure of women and mi-
norities to close the wage gap with white men and to overcome occu-
pational segregation on the basis of sex and race suggests that there is
either an insufficient amount of litigation to discourage these prac-
tices or that nonlitigation alternatives are necessary to confront
them.27 Neither side of the debate appears to articulate what the ap-
propriate level of employment discrimination litigation should be,
and the ability of plaintiffs to obtain either just results or unwarranted
windfalls always seems to underlie the debate about the volume of
litigation.
To bring some clarity to this debate, Nielson and Nelson employ
the concept of the "pyramid of disputes"28 to analyze the employment
discrimination claiming system.2 9 At the bottom of the pyramid are
"perceived injurious experiences."3 0 A subset of perceived injurious
experiences constitutes "grievances": injuries that are cognizable legal
claims. 3' When the injured individual contacts the alleged perpetra-
tor, the grievance becomes a "claim."32 The claim becomes a "dis-
pute" if the alleged perpetrator denies responsibility.3 3  Finally, a
subset of disputes becomes "filings" when the injured party makes a
Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1292-93 (2001) (observing that when the affirmative defense is
applied mechanically, as in Moore v. Sam's Club, 55 F. Supp. 2d 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), employ-
ers cannot escape vicarious liability if the plaintiff promptly reports the harassment, no
matter how many preventative or corrective measures are in place).
25 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 666.
26 See id. at 666-67.
27 See id. at 667-69.
28 See generally William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation ofDisputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . . , 15 LAw & Soc'v REv. 631 (1981) (providing a framework
for analyzing the emergence and transformation of disputes); Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 11-36 (1983) (analyzing the dispute
and litigation explosion through the lens of the pyramid of disputes); Richard E. Miller &
Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 law & Soc'v
REv. 525 (1981) (analyzing the origin of disputes and the incidence of grievances, claims,
and disputes).
29 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 680-701.
30 Id. at 681; see Felstiner et al., supra note 28, at 633; Galanter, supra note 28, at 13.
31 Galanter, supra note 28, at 13; Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 681; see Felstiner
et al., supra note 28, at 635.
32 Felstiner et al., supra note 28, at 635-36; Galanter, supra note 28, at 13; Nielsen &
Nelson, supra note 1, at 681.
33 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 681; see Felstiner et al., supra note 28, at 636;
Galanter, supra note 28, at 13.
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formal complaint.3 4 Although disputes normally become filings when
the claimant files a complaint in court, because employment discrimi-
nation claimants must exhaust administrative remedies before filing
in federal court, an employment discrimination dispute becomes a fil-
ing when the claimant files a charge with the EEOC. 3
Because changes at the bottom of the pyramid affect the levels
above, information about the lower levels is invaluable. Unfortu-
nately, obtaining a precise estimate of the number of grievances at any
given time is probably impossible because of over- and underreport-
ing. Individuals may overreport grievances because not every per-
ceived injury is a cognizable legal claim, and they may underreport
grievances because they have a cognizable claim but do not believe
the injury gives rise to a claim.3 6 Despite these difficulties, the best
attempts at measuring the pyramid suggest that its slopes are very shal-
low and that only 5% of grievances become lawsuits and only 0.06% of
grievances proceed to trial.3 7 As noted above, the number of employ-
ment discrimination filings has dropped in absolute numbers and as a
proportion of the federal docket since the publication of Nielsen and
Nelson's article.38 Those concerned that employment discrimination
litigation was clogging the federal docket may find some solace in this
recent decline.
Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab take a more ominous view of
the recent downturn in employment discrimination litigation. They
suggest that plaintiffs and their attorneys are becoming increasingly
discouraged by the realization that they have "a tough row to hoe" in
federal court.3 9 They posit that federal courts may be more hostile to
employment discrimination plaintiffs and observe that the steepest de-
clines in filed cases occurred in federal circuits that plaintiffs' attor-
neys have identified as most hostile to employment discrimination
plaintiffs.40
34 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 681.
35 See Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009). The Supreme
Court's decision in Faragher suggests that the formal complaint process may even begin
with an internal complaint because failing to utilize the company's complaint process may
provide the company with an affirmative defense. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998).
36 See Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 682-83.
37 See id. at 682. These data come from all civil cases, not just employment discrimina-
tion cases, and suggest that only 1.2% of court filings proceed to trial. Specifically, if 5% of
grievances become court filings and .06% of grievances proceed to trial, then approxi-
mately 1.2% of court filings end in trial. This study suggests that a similar percentage of
employment discrimination cases end in trial. See infra Table 1 (showing that bench trials
and jury trials combined represent less than 2% of dispositions of all employment discrimi-
nation suits during the study period).
38 Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 103.
39 Id. at 103, 121.
40 Id. at 118-19.
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They base their conclusion on their analysis of events at the very
top of the pyramid: plaintiff success rates before trial, at trial, and on
appeal. They reject the intuitive view that employment discrimination
plaintiffs suffer higher rates of defeat in federal court because they are
overly litigious and bring weak cases. 4 1 Rather, Clermont and Schwab
claim that the unique vulnerability of victorious plaintiffs to reversal
on appeal demonstrates that federal appellate courts are biased
against employment discrimination plaintiffs. They further argue that
this hostility likely explains the lower success rates of employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs in district court before and during trial.4 2
Although the rate of appeal is similar for plaintiffs and defend-
ants in employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs file more appeals
because they suffer more defeats in pretrial and trial adjudications
than defendants. 43 On appeal, victorious plaintiffs have a harder time
defending their victories from reversal than victorious defendants,
and unsuccessful plaintiffs are less likely to obtain reversals than un-
successful defendants. These effects are even more pronounced for
employment discrimination plaintiffs.4 4 Clermont and Schwab deny
that these effects are due to selection of specific types of cases for
appeal. They contend, instead, that these effects result from appellate
judges' conscious or unconscious biases towards trial court
adjudication. 45
Clermont and Schwab further speculate that appellate court
judges view trial courts as being particularly proplaintiff or that appel-
late court judges discount plaintiffs' harms because of their distance
from the trial process. 46 If the first hypothesis is true, then the appel-
late judges' beliefs regarding the sympathies of trial court judges, at
least in the case of employment discrimination plaintiffs, is probably
mistaken.47 As Clermont and Schwab note, employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs suffer more defeats relative to other plaintiffs even at
the trial court level. 48 Whether appellate court bias against plaintiffs
is conscious or unconscious, Clermont and Schwab find additional
support for their theory in the fact that antiplaintiff bias appears to be
strongest in cases systematically involving underdog plaintiffs, i.e. civil-
rights-type cases.49
41 See id. at 114 n.34.
42 See id. at 131-32.
43 Id. at 109.
44 Id. at 110-12.
45 Id. at 112-15.
46 Id. at 113.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 127.
49 Id. at 113-14.
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Clermont and Schwab concede that their attitudinal explanation
of the antiplaintiff effect is not irrefutable, but they identify four rea-
sons why the prevailing counterarguments-that plaintiffs bring too
many weak cases, present them ineffectively, and appeal too fre-
quently-are less persuasive.5 0 First, they do not find any empirical
basis for inferring a difference in strength between plaintiffs' and de-
fendants' cases and state that employment discrimination plaintiffs
face many of the same financial incentives as other plaintiffs. Second,
employment discrimination cases that make it through pretrial adjudi-
cation to trial should be as strong as cases from other types of litiga-
tion that proceed that far since they all face the same standard of
review. The same can be said for employment discrimination cases
that proceed from the district court to the appellate court. Third, the
antiplaintiff effect appears to prevail between corporate parties, ex-
cluding the possibility that the antiplaintiff effect is purely the result
of "one-shot have not[ ]" litigants proceeding against well-financed re-
peat players.51 Finally, no combination of assumptions regarding case
strength, repeat players, appeal rates, and judicial accuracy could pro-
duce the observed patterns of litigation.
Although the scope of Clermont and Schwab's study-virtually
every terminated case in the U.S. District Courts from 1979 to 2006
and in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 1970 to 200952-is unparal-
leled, it relies on problematic data assembled by the AO and the Fed-
eral Judicial Center and cannot achieve the level of detail obtainable
from direct examination of court records.53 These limitations do not
seriously undermine the veracity of Clermont and Schwab's conclu-
sions regarding pretrial motions, trial adjudications, and appeals; they
do, however, prevent Clermont and Schwab from addressing other
questions about how employment discrimination plaintiffs fare in fed-
eral court, particularly with regard to settlements.
II
PRIOR EMPIRiCAL RESEARCH ON SETTLEMENT RATES
As I noted earlier, settlement is the modal civil case outcome and
the most common successful outcome for plaintiffs, well ahead of pre-
trial and trial victories.5 4 Obtaining an accurate assessment of the set-
tlement rate is therefore crucial to evaluating the success of
employment discrimination plaintiffs in federal court.
50 Id. at 115-16 n.34.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 106 display 1.
53 See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
54 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 111.
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The federal court data assembled by the AO is " [b] y far the most
prominent" database used by legal researchers for statistical analysis of
litigation.5 5 Although this claim may be an exaggeration, the AO
database is undoubtedly one of the most popular, likely because of its
completeness.56 Ostensibly, the AO database includes every case filed
in federal court: because clerks enter cases upon both filing and ter-
mination, permitting reconciliation of case filings, the AO database
includes a built-in check to ensure completeness.57 This virtue alone
makes it an extremely valuable data set. Because the purpose of the
database is to allocate limited resources within the federal court sys-
tem,58 variables in the database that are useful for tracking court wor-
Idoad and assigning resources are highly reliable.59 Accordingly, one
of the most useful variables for researchers is the case category varia-
ble, which identifies the specific subject matter of individual cases.60
The case codes appear to be highly reliable and are, at the least, not
overinclusive. 61
Nevertheless, the purpose of the database gives rise to several lim-
itations for analyzing case outcomes.62 For example, courts use
nonunique terminology for the same disposition in different cases,
and a single disposition can identify a group of cases that contains
both settled and unsettled cases. In these instances, the researcher
must infer settlement when it appears to be the most likely outcome
and vice versa.6 3 In Gillian Hadfield's 2004 study of the accuracy of
AO disposition codes, she found error rates as high as 69% in the
codes in which she expected to find nontrial adjudications. 6 4 More
55 Frank B. Cross, Comparative judicial Databases, 83 JuicruPE 248, 248 (2000).
56 Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1455, 1462
(2003).
57 Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 56, at 1462-63.
58 Id. at 1462; Gillian K Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 712 (2004).
59 Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 56, at 1462.
60 Id. at 1463.
61 Id. Although Eisenberg and Schlanger were unable to ascertain the degree of un-
derinclusiveness of the case category variable, they believe that case codes are highly relia-
ble because the AO uses them to allocate judicial resources. Id.
62 Hadfield, supra note 58, at 712.
63 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 114 ("No single, agreed method of com-
puting settlement rates exists because judgment calls exist how about [sic] to translate a
range of formal case outcomes into the dichotomous characterization of settled or not
settled.")
64 Hadfield, supra note 58, at 711. For reference, the AO disposition codes are:
0 = Transfer/remand: transfer to another district, I = Transfer/remand: remanded to state
court, 2 = Dismissals: want of prosecution, 3 = Dismissals: lack ofjurisdiction, 4 =Judgment
on: default, 5 =Judgment on: consent, 6 =Judgment on: motion before trial, 7 =Judgment
on: jury verdict, 8 = Judgment on: directed verdict, 9 = Judgment on: court trial,
10 = Transfer/remand: multi district litigation, 11 = Transfer/remand: remanded to U.S.
2011] 1255
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significantly, she also found substantial Type 2 errors.65 For example,
many cases that settled and should be in the AO's "Dismissed: settled"
category appear in other categories such as "Dismissed: other" or
"Judgment on motion before trial."66 These errors are not specifically
the result of the AO's coding but rather "the error that researchers
will make if they interpret the AO codes to be mutually exclusive and
rely solely on the name of the category to understand the nature of
the cases coded in that category."67 Accordingly, although 97% of
Hadfields's sample of cases coded as "Dismissed: voluntary" correctly
identified a case as voluntarily dismissed, over half of those cases were
really settlements: typically cases dismissed with prejudice on a stipu-
lated or joint motion, a plaintiffs motion, or the court's own mo-
tion.68 The best source for accurate disposition data on settlement,
therefore, is not the AO database but the actual court records.69
The Eisenberg-Lanvers study of the settlement rate provides an
excellent example of a PACER-based research project and illuminates
many of the difficulties of accurately assessing the settlement rate,
even when using actual court records. The authors stress that the
method for calculating settlement rate should adapt to the purpose
for which it is used.70 They identify at least two purposes for calculat-
ing the settlement rate: to calculate plaintiff success rates and to com-
pare cases that terminate as a result of contested proceedings with
those that do not.7 ' The purpose for calculating the settlement rate
therefore determines which cases are included in the denominator
and the numerator.
If the purpose for calculating the settlement rate is to assess plain-
tiff success rates, then relying exclusively on the AO disposition code
is especially risky. The AO code "Dismissals: settled" is an underinclu-
sive proxy for plaintiff success because, as noted above, several other
Agency, 12 = Dismissals: voluntarily, 13 = Dismissals: settled, 14 = Dismissals: other,
15 = Judgment on: award of arbitrator, 16 = Judgment on: stayed pending bankruptcy,
17 = Judgment on: other, 18 = Judgment on: statistical closing, 19 = Judgment on: appeal
affirmed (magistrate judgment), 20 =Judgment on: appeal denied (magistrate judgment),
-8 = Missing. INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & Soc. RESEARCi, ICPSR STUDY No.
22300, FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 2007-CODEBOOK FOR CIVIL TERMI-
NATIONS DATA at 97-98 (2009), available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cgi-bin/file?comp
=none&study=22300&ds=1&fileid=1043029.
65 Hadfield, supra note 58, at 711.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 723.
68 Id. at 723-24.
69 Both Hadfield's and Eisenberg and Schlanger's studies used actual court records
obtained through PACER to assess the reliability of the AO database. See Eisenberg &
Schlanger, supra note 56, at 1459; Hadfield, supra note 65, at 711.
7 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 114; see also Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation
Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1919, 1955 n.180 (2009) (calling the definition of
the settlement rate "critical").
71 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 116.
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AO disposition codes reflect settlements.72 AO codes that probably
reflect settlements include "Judgment on: consent" and "Dismissals:
voluntarily."7 3 Simply including these dispositions in the numerator,
however, will not yield an accurate estimation of the settlement rate as
a proxy for plaintiff success. Voluntary dismissals and joint stipula-
tions of dismissal without prejudice likely reflect withdrawals to permit
refiling or plaintiffs that have simply given up rather than settle-
ments.74 Accordingly, dismissals without prejudice do not belong in
the numerator when calculating the settlement rate for the purpose of
assessing plaintiff success. Because the AO codes do not distinguish
between dismissals with and without prejudice, they are insufficient
for accurately calculating the settlement rate as a proxy for plaintiff
success.
Clermont and Schwab's broadly sweeping study using the AO dis-
position codes illustrates the use of the settlement rate to measure
cases that terminate without contested proceedings. They included
the following AO disposition codes in the numerator of their settle-
ment rate calculation: (1) "Dismissals: want of prosecution," (2) "Judg-
ment on: default," (3) "Judgment on: consent," (4) "Dismissals:
voluntarily," (5) "Dismissals: settled," (6) "Dismissals: other," and (6)
'Judgment on: statistical closing."75 These seven dispositions accu-
rately capture cases that terminated without adjudication and are
therefore suitable for Clermont and Schwab's purposes, but they also
include a significant number of cases in which the plaintiff did not
recover anything from the defendant. Accordingly, they do not re-
flect settlement as a proxy for plaintiff success.
Which dispositions to include in the denominator is also a con-
tentious issue that can only be solved by exercising good judgment.
Several of the AO codes are only temporary dispositions and not final
terminations of a case: transfer to another district, remand to state
court, transfer to an MDL panel, remand to a U.S. agency, stay pend-
ing arbitration, stay pending bankruptcy, and statistical closing.76
Cases with these dispositions may settle or the court may decide them
on the merits.7 7 Although I exclude them from settlement rate calcu-
lations, Eisenberg and Lanvers have suggested that censoring these
dispositions and using Cox survival models to perform regression
analysis may be a superior method for calculating the settlement
rate.78
72 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
73 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 116-17.
74 Id. at 117.
75 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 121 n.56.
76 Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 117-18.
7 See id.





The present study uses data from docket reports, complaints, and
other court documents from cases that terminated in both divisions of
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland between
October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008. I selected a district that
Eisenberg and Lanvers did not study in order to explore interdistrict
variations in plaintiff success rates. I chose the District of Maryland
specifically out of personal curiosity. The data in my study are more
contemporary than the data in the Eisenberg-Lanvers study and pro-
vide a more recent picture of employment discrimination litigation in
federal district court. However, the divergence in both time and dis-
trict complicates comparisons with their study because any differences
may be due to either of these independent variables or the interaction
of both of them.
I began by obtaining a list of cases that terminated in the District
of Maryland during the study period from the AO database.79 I sorted
that data set by case category and then collected docket reports and
complaints from PACER for the following three categories of cases:
employment discrimination (AO case category code 442), contract
(AO case category 190), and personal-injury tort (AO case category
codes 310-68). The final sample includes every employment discrimi-
nation and contract case that terminated during the study period and
a random sample of roughly half of the personal-injury tort cases that
terminated during the same period.
I collected data directly from the PACER records and combined
it with the docket numbers and case category information obtained
from the AO database. The most difficult part of data collection was
coding case outcomes based on docket information. I initially re-
corded each case's final disposition in a free text field. I reviewed
ambiguous dispositions before assigning every case one of the disposi-
tion codes in the following table.
Regrettably, some conceptual overlap in the disposition codes re-
mains due to the varying specificity of the information in the docket
reports. For instance, a docket report may record a dismissal for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction as either "Lack of jurisdiction" or as a
pretrial motion under "Summary judgment, judgment on pretrial mo-
79 The Federal Judicial Center assembles the data gathered by the AO, and the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research disseminates the data through its
website. For the 2008 database, see Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2008, INTER-U.
CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & Soc. REs., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/stud-
ies/25002?archive=ICPSR&q=federal+judicial@enter (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
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TABLE 1: CASE DISPOSITION CODEs, D. MD. (2007-2008)
Disposition Number Percentage
of Cases of Sample
Administrative closing, arbitration 5 0.73
Administrative closing, bankruptcy 2 0.29
Administrative closing, MDL 29 4.29
Administrative closing, pending Supreme Court decision 1 0.15
Administrative closing, state court 2 0.29
Arbitration award 2 0.29
Bench trial 5 0.73
Confessed judgment 4 0.59
Consolidated 6 0.88
Default judgment 27 3.95
Dismissal/withdrawal without prejudice 46 6.73
Failure to timely serve, Rule 4(m) 10 1.46
Failure to prosecute or comply with court order/rules 8 1.17
In forma pauperis case dismissed 17 2.49
Judgment as a matter of law 1 0.15
Jury trial 8 1.17
Lack of jurisdiction 11 1.61
Motion to dismiss, other 6 0.88
Referred to bankruptcy 1 0.15
Remanded 24 3.51
Settlement order dismissing 182 26.65
Settlement inferred, consent decree 23 3.37
Settlement inferred, stipulation 104 15.23
Settlement inferred, voluntary dismissal 17 2.49
Summary judgment, judgment on pretrial motion 131 19.18
Transferred 11 1.61
Total 683 100.04
NOTE: Sample consists of all employment discrimination cases (AO code 442), all contract
cases (AO code 190), and a random sample of roughly half of all personal-injury tort cases
(AO codes 310-68) terminating in the District of Maryland between October 1, 2007, and
September 30, 2008. Inferences about the relative frequency of disposition codes should
account for these features of the sample. Because of rounding error, category percentages
do not add to exactly 100%.
SOURCE: PACER.
tion."80 This overlap is largely due to the language and nonunique
terminology of the docket reports. For a few obscure dispositions, I
consulted the final court order to determine the precise disposition.
IV
RESULTS
I have organized the results of my study in a series of tables. Ta-
bles 2-5 present various calculations of the settlement rate by case
category. These tables illustrate how the settlement rate fluctuates
based on the definition of settlement and whether nonterminating
so Of course, these categories do not completely overlap. A summary judgment dis-
missal could only be coded as the latter and not the former.
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dispositions are included in the denominator. I then present further
results utilizing the settlement rate calculation contained in Table 2.
To illustrate variations across time and district while holding the set-
tlement rate calculation method constant, I have included compara-
ble results from the Eisenberg-Lanvers study.
Tables 2 and 3 report the settlement rate as a proxy for plaintiff
success. They count cases with the following dispositions as settled
cases: settlement order dismissing, consent decree, stipulation of dis-
missal (with prejudice), and voluntary dismissal (with prejudice). The
difference between the two tables is that Table 2 does not include
nonterminating dispositions in the denominator of the settlement
rate. I counted the following dispositions as nonterminating disposi-
tions: administrative closing, consolidated, referred to bankruptcy, re-
manded, and transferred. Because the two tables use the same set of
dispositions to determine the numerator but Table 3 includes more
kinds of dispositions in the denominator, the settlement rates in Table
3 are lower than those in Table 2.
TABLE 2: SETTLEMENT RATEs (EXCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DIsPosITIoNs) AS A PROXY FOR PLAINTIFF SUCCESS BY CASE CATEGORY;
D. MD. (2007-2008), E.D. PA. (2001-2002), AND N.D. GA.
(2001-2002)
District Case Category Number of Cases Settlement Rate
(%); (95 % CI)
D. Md. Employment Discrimination 219 44.3; (37.7-50.9)
D. Md. Contract 204 52.0; (45.0-58.9)
D. Md. Personal-Injury Tort 179 68.7; (61.9-75.6)
E.D. Pa. Employment Discrimination 415 82.4; (78.7-86.1)
E.D. Pa. Contract 170 65.3; (58.1-72.5)
E.D. Pa. Personal-Injury Tort 274 87.2; (83.3-91.2)
N.D. Ga. Employment Discrimination 542 55.5; (51.3-59.7)
N.D. Ga. Contract 160 72.5; (65.6-79.4)
N.D. Ga. Personal-Injury Tort 174 63.8; (56.6-71.0)
NOTE: CI = confidence interval. Case categories reflect the following AO codes:
employment discrimination = AO code 442, contract = AO code 190, personal-injury tort =
AO codes 310-68. Time period covered for the District of Maryland includes cases
terminating between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008. Time period covered for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia includes cases
filed between January 8, 2002, and July 8, 2002, and terminating between July 8, 2001, and
January 7, 2002. Comparisons between the settlement rates in the District of Maryland and
the other two federal district courts should account for this difference.
SOURCES: PACER; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPiRIcAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 130 (2009).
Tables 4 and 5 report the settlement rate as a proxy for
nonadjudicated terminations. In addition to the cases counted as set-
tled in Tables 2 and 3, Tables 4 and 5 count cases with the following
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TABLE 3: SETTLEMENT RATES (INCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DIsPosrIoNs) AS A PROXY FOR PLAINTIFF SUCCESS BY CASE CATEGORY;
D. MD. (2007-2008), E.D. PA. (2001-2002), AND N.D. GA.
(2001-2002)
District Case Category Number of Cases Settlement Rate
(%); (95% C1)
D. Md. Employment Discrimination 227 42.7; (36.2-49.2)
D. Md. Contract 225 47.1; (40.5-53.7)
D. Md. Personal-Injury Tort 231 53.2; (46.8-59.7)
E.D. Pa. Employment Discrimination Unavailable 77.0; (73.1-80.9)
E.D. Pa. Contract Unavailable 55.8; (48.9-62.7)
E.D. Pa. Personal-Injury Tort Unavailable 64.8; (59.9-69.7)
N.D. Ga. Employment Discrimination Unavailable 52.7; (48.6-56.8)
N.D. Ga. Contract Unavailable 58.9; (52.0-65.8)
N.D. Ga. Personal-Injury Tort Unavailable 50.0; (43.4-56.6)
NOTE: CI = confidence interval. Case categories reflect the following AO codes:
employment discrimination = AO code 442, contract = AO code 190, personal-injury tort =
AO codes 310-68. Time period covered for the District of Maryland includes cases
terminating between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008. Time period covered for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia includes cases
filed between January 8, 2002, andJuly 8, 2002, and terminating between July 8, 2001, and
January 7, 2002. Comparisons between the settlement rates in the District of Maryland and
the other two federal district courts should account for this difference. Eisenberg and
Lanvers did not report the number of cases by district and case category when they
calculated settlement rates as a proxy for plaintiff success and included nonterminating
dispositions.
SOURCES: PACER; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 6J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 130 (2009).
dispositions as settled: confessed judgment, default judgment, failure
to timely serve, failure to prosecute, dismissal/withdrawal without
prejudice. The difference between Tables 4 and 5 is the same as be-
tween Tables 2 and 3; Table 4 excludes nonterminating dispositions
from the denominator and Table 5 does not. Because Tables 2 and 4
use the same denominator but Table 4 includes more dispositions in
the numerator, the settlement rates in Table 4 will always be higher
than in Table 2. Likewise, the settlement rates in Table 5 will always
be higher than in Table 3 because these two tables use the same de-
nominator but Table 5 includes more types of dispositions in the
numerator.
Table 6 reports the actual plaintiff victory rate and reproduces
the settlement rate as a proxy for plaintiff success excluding
nonterminating dispositions from the denominator. The difference
between the two rates, which use the same denominator, is that the
plaintiff victory rate also includes pretrial and trial judgments for the
plaintiff in the numerator. This table illustrates just how important
settlement is to plaintiffs in most cases. Out of 219 cases with termi-
nating dispositions, the only successes that employment discrimina-
2011] 1261
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TABLE 4: SETTLEMENT RATES (EXCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DISPOSITIONS) AS A PROXY FOR NONADJUDICATED TERMINATIONS BY
CASE CATEGORY; D. MD. (2007-2008), E.D. PA. (2001-2002), AND
N.D. GA. (2001-2002)
District Case Category Number of Cases Settlement Rate
(%); (95% CI)
D. Md. Employment Discrimination 219 51.6; (44.9-58.3)
D. Md. Contract 204 84.3; (79.3-89.3)
D. Md. Personal-Injury Tort 179 76.0; (69.7-82.3)
E.D. Pa. Employment Discrimination 415 83.9; (80.3-87.4)
E.D. Pa. Contract 170 76.5; (70.1-82.9)
E.D. Pa. Personal-Injury Tort 274 89.0; (85.3-92.8)
N.D. Ga. Employment Discrimination 542 37.9; (32.1-43.6)
N.D. Ga. Contract 160 79.4; (73.1-85.7)
N.D. Ga. Personal-Injury Tort 174 72.1; (65.4-78.8)
NOTE: Cl confidence interval. Case categories reflect the following AO codes:
employment discrimination = AO code 442, contract = AO code 190, personal-injury tort =
AO codes 310-68. Time period covered for the District of Maryland includes cases
terminating between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008. Time period covered for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia includes cases
filed between January 8, 2002, andJuly 8, 2002, and terminating between July 8, 2001, and
January 7, 2002. Comparisons between the settlement rates in the District of Maryland and
the other two federal district courts should account for this difference.
SOURCES: PACER; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 6J. EmpicAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 131 (2009).
tion plaintiffs obtained outside of settlement in the District of
Maryland were two jury trial victories. Similarly, the only nonsettle-
ment success that tort plaintiffs were able to obtain in the 179 termi-
nating cases was one victory following a bench trial. Although the
plaintiff victory rate for contract plaintiffs is significantly higher than
the settlement rate, default judgments make up the bulk of that differ-
ence. Accordingly, most of those plaintiffs might not be able to col-
lect on the judgment they obtained.
Table 7 reports settlement rates as a proxy for plaintiff success by
employment discrimination case category. Once again, I report com-
parable data from the Eisenberg-Lanvers study. Unfortunately, Eisen-
berg and Lanvers did not report settlement rates for cases with
national origin, disability, or retaliation claims. Because individual
employment discrimination plaintiffs frequently bring claims of dis-
crimination on multiple bases, a single case may be counted in more
than one employment discrimination case category. Accordingly, the
settlement rates for some specific types of employment discrimination
claims may be inflated or deflated because that particular type of




TABLE 5: SETTLEMENT RATES (INCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DISPOSITIONS) AS A PROXY FOR NONADJUDICATED TERMINATIONS BY
CASE CATEGORY; D. MD. (2007-2008), E.D. PA. (2001-2002), AND
N.D. GA. (2001-2002)
District Case Category Number of Cases Settlement Rate
(%); (95% CI)
D. Md. Employment Discrimination 227 49.8; (43.2-56.3)
D. Md. Contract 225 76.4; (70.9-82.0)
D. Md. Personal-Injury Tort 231 58.9; (52.5-65.3)
E.D. Pa. Employment Discrimination Unavailable 78.4; (74.5-82.2)
E.D. Pa. Contract Unavailable 65.3; (58.7-72.0)
E.D. Pa. Personal-Injury Tort Unavailable 66.1; (61.3-71.0)
N.D. Ga. Employment Discrimination Unavailable 62.5; (58.5-66.5)
N.D. Ga. Contract Unavailable 64.5; (57.8-71.2)
N.D. Ga. Personal-Injury Tort Unavailable 56.4; (49.8-62.9)
NOTE: CI = confidence interval. Case categories reflect the following AO codes:
employment discrimination = AO code 442, contract = AO code 190, personal-injury tort =
AO codes 310-68. Time period covered for the District of Maryland includes cases
terminating between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008. Time period covered for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia includes cases
filed between January 8, 2002, andJuly 8, 2002, and terminating between July 8, 2001, and
January 7, 2002. Comparisons between the settlement rates in the District of Maryland and
the other two federal district courts should account for this difference. Eisenberg and
Lanvers did not report the number of cases by district and case category when they
calculated settlement rates as a proxy for nonadjudicated terminations and included
nonterminating dispositions.
SOURCES: PACER; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 131 (2009).
Finally, Table 8 lists the frequency of race discrimination claims
by the race of the plaintiff. African-American plaintiffs clearly re-
present the bulk of race discrimination plaintiffs in the District of Ma-
TABLE 6: SETTLEMENT RATES (EXCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DISPOSITIONS) AS A PROXY FOR PLAINTIFF SUCCESS BY CASE CATEGORY
COMPARED WITH PLAINTIFF VIcrORY RATES; D. MD. (2007-2008)
District Case Category Number Settlement Rate Plaintiff Victory
of Cases (%); (95% CI) Rate (%); (95% CI)
D. Md. Employment Discrimination 219 44.3; (37.7-50.9) 45.2; (38.6--51.8)
D. Md. Contract 204 52.0; (45.0-58.9) 70.1; (63.8-76.4)
D. Md. Personal-Injury Tort 179 68.7; (61.9-75.6) 69.3; (62.4-76.1)
NOTE: CI = confidence interval. Sample consists of all employment discrimination
cases (AO code 442), all contract cases (AO code 190), and a random sample of
roughly half of all personal-injury tort cases (AO codes 310-68) terminating in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland between October 1, 2007,




TABLE 7: SETTLEMENT RATES (EXCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DISPOSITIONS) AS A PROXY FOR PLAINTIFF SUCCESS By EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASE CATEGORY; D. MD. (2007-2008), E.D. PA.
(2001-2002), AND N.D. GA. (2001-2002)
Employment Discrimination Number of Cases; Settlement Rate
District Case Category (% of Total Cases) (%); (95% CI)
D. Md. Race 107; 48.46 38.3; (29.0-47.7)
D. Md. Sex 80; 35.68 47.5; (36.3-58.7)
D. Md. Age 43; 20.25 44.2; (28.7-59.7)
D. Md. National Origin 27; 12.78 51.8; (31.7-72.0)
D. Md. Disability 31; 14.10 32.3; (14.8-49.7)
D. Md. Retaliation 94; 43.17 44.7; (34.4-54.9)
E.D. Pa. Race 111; 26.75 79.3; (71.6-86.9)
E.D. Pa. Sex 113; 27.22 85.8; (79.3-92.4)
E.D. Pa. Age 68; 16.39 77.9; (67.8-88.0)
N.D. Ga. Race 213; 39.30 51.6; (44.9-58.4)
N.D. Ga. Sex 185; 34.13 61.6; (54.5-68.7)
N.D. Ga. Age 52; 9.59 59.6; (45.8-75.4)
NOTE: C1 = confidence interval. Case categories reflect the following AO codes:
employment discrimination = AO code 442, contract = AO code 190, personal-injury tort =
AO codes 310-68. Time period covered for the District of Maryland includes cases
terminating between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008. Time period covered for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia includes cases
filed between January 8, 2002, and July 8, 2002 and terminating between July 8, 2001, and
January 7, 2002. Comparisons between the settlement rates in the District of Maryland and
the other two federal district courts should account for this difference.
SOURCES: PACER; Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPiRiCAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 130 (2009).
ryland. The "Other" category below includes Native-American,
Middle Eastern, and Moorish-American, each with one case. In 10%
of the race discrimination cases, I could not obtain the race of the
plaintiff from any of the documents in the docket. These cases typi-
cally had pro se plaintiffs who did not state their race in the complaint
and were dismissed before the defendant even replied. In national-
origin discrimination cases, the most common nations of origin were
African nations followed by nations in Latin America and the Middle
East. In sex discrimination cases, roughly three-quarters of plaintiffs
were female and the remaining quarter was male.
V
DISCUSSION
These new data on settlement rates suggest an even more compli-
cated picture of employment discrimination litigation. Prior research
on employment discrimination has tended to show that employment
1264 [Vol. 96:1247
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TABLE 8: RACE OF PLAINTIFF IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
ALLEGING RACE DISCRIMINATION (INCLUDING NONTERMINATING
DISPOSITIONS); D. MD. (2007-2008)








NOTE: Sample consists of all employment discrimination cases (AO code 442) alleging
race discrimination and terminating in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland between October 1, 2008, and September 30, 2008.
SOURCE: PACER.
discrimination plaintiffs fare worse than other kinds of plaintiffs.8 ' Al-
though the results of this study corroborate this finding, they also un-
cover substantial interdistrict and/or temporal differences in the
settlement rate for employment discrimination cases.
The relationship between the settlement rates for each of the
three case categories varies from district to district. In the District of
Maryland, personal-injury tort cases have the highest settlement rate,
followed by contract and employment discrimination cases respec-
tively.8 2 Moreover, the differences between the settlement rates for
employment discrimination cases and the other two types of cases are
statistically significant. The difference between the settlement rate for
contract cases and tort cases is also significant.
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, tort cases continue to
have the highest settlement rate, but the difference between the settle-
ment rates for tort cases and employment discrimination cases is not
statistically significant.8 3 Contract cases in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania have the lowest settlement rate of the three categories,
and the differences between the settlement rates for contract cases
and the other two categories are significant.
Finally, in the Northern District of Georgia, contract cases have
the highest settlement rate followed by tort and then employment dis-
crimination cases.8 4 However, only the difference between the settle-
81 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 4, at 104; Clermont & Schwab, supra note
1, at 429; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts:
Civil Rights Really Do Diffe from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 958; Nielsen
& Nelson, supra note 1, at 673.
82 Supra Table 2.
83 Supra Table 2.
84 Supra Table 2.
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ment rates for contract and employment discrimination cases is
statistically significant. The differences between contract and tort
cases and between tort and employment discrimination cases are not
significant.
The settlement rate for employment discrimination cases also var-
ies significantly between the three districts.85 The settlement rate for
employment discrimination cases is lowest in Maryland and highest in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which generally has high settle-
ment rates. Indeed, Eisenberg and Lanvers found that the Eastern
District has a high settlement rate for employment discrimination
cases relative to other districts in the Third Circuit.86 These interdis-
trict variations are intriguing but hard to explain.
Eisenberg and Lanvers suggest that this interdistrict variation has
not been stable over time.87 An older study that looked at cases filed
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of
Georgia during 1980-1981 did not find the same interdistrict varia-
tion as for the 2001-2002 data reported here.88 Both districts did,
however, have low settlement rates for employment discrimination
cases.89 Because the data in this study from the District of Maryland is
largely from 2008, any interdistrict variation may be entirely due to
temporal considerations or the interaction of the time and district
variables.
One possible explanation is that the differences in employment
discrimination settlement rates are due to different mixtures of classes
of employment discrimination cases within each district. At least one
researcher has found differences in case outcome based on the class
of employment discrimination case.90 Different relative frequencies
of types of employment discrimination cases might explain some of
the interdistrict variation. However, the Eisenberg-Lanvers study did
not report any significant differences in settlement rates between
types of employment discrimination cases.9i Although the sample
sizes in this study are too small to conclusively state that there are no
85 See supra Table 2.
86 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 142. To reach this conclusion, the authors
relied on AO data, reasoning that relative settlement rates would remain roughly stable
even if individual actual settlement rates change. See id.
87 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 6, at 139.
98 Id.
89 See id. at 139-40.
90 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California
Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for
Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 511, 514 (2003) ("The most significant finding
is that women and minorities are substantially disadvantaged in bringing certain kinds of
employment discrimination claims, as compared with the success rates of all plaintiffs in all
employment law jury trials.").




differences in settlement rates between types of employment discrimi-
nation cases, the results tend to corroborate their finding. The analy-
sis did not uncover any significant differences in the settlement rates
for race, sex, and age cases or for the other three types of discrimina-
tion cases: national origin, disability, and retaliation.92 Settlement
rates by type of employment discrimination case did differ across dis-
tricts. The settlement rates for race, sex, and age cases in Maryland
differed significantly from their counterparts in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania but did not differ from the settlement rates in the North-
ern District of Georgia. However, this difference is probably a result
of the small sample sizes, given that the overall settlement rates for
employment discrimination cases in the two districts differed
significantly.
Although this study found no statistically significant differences
in settlement rates for different types of employment discrimination
cases within each district, future researchers should continue to ex-
plore this as a determinant of interdistrict variation. Because the sam-
ple size in this study is small, it may be unable to detect a small but
real difference in settlement rates by type of employment discrimina-
tion alleged and thus cannot exclude this variable as a source of in-
terdistrict variation in the settlement rate for employment
discrimination cases generally.
Besides describing the (nonsignificant) variation in settlement
rates between types of employment discrimination cases, Table 7 also
suggests that district court filing rates for each type of employment
discrimination case may diverge from EEOC filing rates. Nielsen and
Nelson report the EEOC filing rates for 2002 and assume that the
"proportion of race cases filed in federal court is the same as the pro-
portion of race charges in the EEOC charge statistics."93 This assump-
tion may be problematic. For example, Nielsen and Nelson report
that the proportion of race claims in the EEOC charge statistics for
2002 is 35.40%.94 During the same time period in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, the proportion of race cases was 26.75 %.95 In 2008 in
the District of Maryland, the proportion of cases with race claims
made up almost half of the total number of cases. 9 6
Of course, there are at least two other explanations for this diver-
gence other than a real difference between EEOC charges and district
court filings. First, the difference in time might explain the diver-
gence in EEOC filings and the district court filing statistics. Second,
92 See supra Table 7.
93 Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 1, at 689 tbl..B, 705-06.
94 Id. at 689 tbl.1.B.
95 Supra Table 7.
96 Supra Table 7.
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the EEOC charge statistics are from the entire nation, and individual
districts may deviate from the national norm. Nevertheless, this differ-
ence may emerge because some plaintiffs, especially pro se plaintiffs,
unwittingly circumvent the EEOC and file first at the district court.
Future researchers should therefore use caution when using EEOC
charge statistics to make inferences about district court filings, espe-
cially because information about the relative filing rates of different
categories of employment discrimination cases is readily accessible for
a low cost through PACER.
As noted earlier, geographic and temporal variables may explain
the interdistrict variation observed in this study. Contemporaneous
data from other districts will easily reveal whether the District of Mary-
land has a uniquely low settlement rate for employment discrimina-
tion cases. If, however, the interdistrict variation in this study is
attributable to temporal considerations, then the results in this study
have implications for Clermont and Schwab's hypothesis that employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs and their lawyers are becoming discour-
aged by their lack of success in federal court.
If the lower settlement rate for employment discrimination cases
in the District of Maryland is a result of the difference in time, then
two causal factors might be at work: either employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs are not responding to their lack of success by bringing
stronger cases or antiplaintiff bias in federal district courts is actually
increasing. This would tend to undermine Clermont and Schwab's
discouragement hypothesis. Of course, longitudinal data is necessary
to demonstrate that the variation in settlement rates is a result of the
difference in time. Specifically, knowing the settlement rate for em-
ployment discrimination cases in the District of Maryland during 2001
and 2002 and the settlement rates for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania and Northern District of Georgia for 2008 would permit
stronger inferences about the cause of the variation in settlement
rates. Because this study raises the specter that things might be get-
ting worse for employment discrimination plaintiffs in federal court, it
indicates the urgency for further research to explain the observed in-
terdistrict variation.
Turning to the differences between the settlement rates for em-
ployment discrimination cases generally and other categories of cases,
one unique feature of employment discrimination litigation may help
explain the variation between employment discrimination cases and
other types of litigation at the district court level. The employment
discrimination litigation pyramid of disputes contains a level that
other types of litigation typically do not: the EEOC. Claimants who
1268 [Vol. 96:1247
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file at the EEOC can obtain favorable, settlement-type resolutions.9 7
Based on nationwide data, Nielsen and Nelson estimate that about
one in five EEOC complainants receive some sort of relief from the
EEOC, while more than 63% of complainants may continue to pursue
their claim in federal court.98 Because these complainants would oth-
erwise begin by filing directly with the federal district court, the EEOC
may divert cases that would settle at the district court off the pyramid
of disputes before they reach the court. Furthermore, pro se plaintiffs
who unwittingly file first in district court without exhausting their ad-
ministrative remedies may raise the rate of summary judgment for em-
ployment discrimination cases and therefore lower the settlement
rate. This hypothesis could help to explain the relatively low success
rates of employment discrimination plaintiffs early in litigation.
Of course, this hypothesis requires empirical support that is be-
yond the scope of this Note. In fact, the opposite conclusion might be
true; because complainants who do not prevail at the EEOC may
abandon their claims at that stage of the pyramid, the EEOC may actu-
ally increase the proportion of plaintiffs with successful complaints at
the district court level. Moreover, even if the EEOC effect is a wash
and does not discourage or encourage plaintiffs to continue to court,
district court judges may carry preconceptions about its effect, leading
them to prejudge cases as nonmeritorious. Further research should,
therefore, consider both the proportion of successful and unsuccess-
ful EEOC claims that are diverted off the pyramid before they reach
the district court and the perceptions of district court judges regard-
ing the impact of the EEOC.
I also collected data on interjudge differences in the settlement
rate. The results of this study corroborate the findings of several
other studies, which indicate that there are no consistent interjudge
differences. 99 Table 9 presents the aggregate settlement rates for
each judge across case categories. The number of observations per
judge is small in some cases, in particular, for Judges Garbis and Nick-
erson, who are senior judges.
Although there is at least one significant difference between indi-
vidual judges (i.e., between Davis and Nickerson), the judge variable is
not a good predictor of case outcome. Moreover, the difference be-
97 See Nielson & Nelson, supra note 1, at 691.
98 See id. at 705.
99 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281
(1995) ("Many will be surprised that we cannot find that Republican judges differ from
Democratic judges in their treatment of civil rights cases. The religion and gender of the
judge had larger but still modest effects."); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P.
Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study offudicial Reasoning, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1467 (1998).
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TABLE 9: AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT RATES (EXCLUDING
NONTERMINATING DISPOSITIONS) AS A PROXY FOR PLAINTIFF SUCCESS
By DISTRICT COURT JUDGE; D. MD. (2007-2008)
judge Number of Cases Settlement Rate (%); (95% CI)
Bennett 65 60.9; (48.7-73.1)
Blake 58 47.0; (33.7-60.3)
Chasanow 61 53.7; (40.8-66.6)
Davis 61 40.2; (27.6-52.8)
Garbis 12 57.9; (28.0-87.8)
Legg 31 51.0; (32.6-69.4)
Messitte 64 50.5; (37.7-63.2)
Motz 54 47.1; (33.1-61.0)
Nickerson 19 76.7; (56.2-97.1)
Quarles 60 48.0; (34.9-61.1)
Titus 68 53.4; (41.1-65.8)
Williams 49 54.4; (40.2-68.7)
NOTE: CI = confidence interval. Aggregate settlement rates and confidence intervals
account for sample design, but sample omits several significant categories of cases
including habeas petitions and civil rights cases unrelated to employment. Time period
covered for the District of Maryland includes cases terminating between October 1, 2007,
and September 30, 2008.
SOURCE: PACER.
tween Nickerson and Davis may be an artifact of the especially small
number of cases that Nickerson handled. A nested logistic regression
controlling for case category (tort, contract, and employment discrim-
ination) further diminished the already very low predictive effect.
Once again, there may be actual differences between judges that are
difficult to discern because they are too small to be detected with the
sample sizes in this study. The volume of litigation that judges handle
may also impose limitations on the size of differences that statistical
analyses can detect. Each additional explanatory variable decreases
the number of observations per cell, and several years of data may be
necessary to detect interjudge differences within a case category if
they exist. If settlement rates vary over time, however, then the in-
terjudge differences may disappear if the sample period is too long.
This study did not address case merit as an explanation for in-
terdistrict, intercategory, or interudge variations. As noted earlier,
many commentators believe, for a variety of asserted reasons, that em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs bring weak cases.100 I did not ad-
dress this variable for several reasons. First, merit is hard to define in
objective terms. Indeed, outside of medical malpractice, studies of ob-
jective merit are rare. Second, because success in litigation is a large
part of merit, objective definitions of merit court circularity. Finally,
100 See supra text accompanying note 41.
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collecting enough case-specific information to make an assessment of
merit is infeasible for a single researcher.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study build on previous research in significant
ways. Because it reports a significantly lower settlement rate for em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs, it helps illustrate how much this
statistic can vary as a function of time and district. It also highlights
the degree that the settlement rate for employment discrimination
plaintiffs can vary compared with two other categories of cases: per-
sonal-injury tort cases and contract cases. Although limited sample
sizes prevented the drawing of conclusive inferences in the presence
of many variables, this study suggests that the relative frequency of
types of employment discrimination cases cannot alone explain in-
terdistrict variations. Additionally, this study corroborates a growing
body of literature that does not find significant and consistent in-
terjudge differences.
Finally, this study has implications for Clermont and Schwab's hy-
pothesis that there is an antiplaintiff bias in appellate courts.101 If ap-
pellate court judges believe that district court judges are unduly
favorable to employment discrimination plaintiffs, then their belief is
probably mistaken. Employment discrimination cases had the lowest
success rate in the District of Maryland of the three categories of litiga-
tion, and this rate was significantly lower than the rate for tort and
contract cases. Furthermore, this study illustrates the urgency for fur-
ther research to precisely determine the cause of these interdistrict
variations. If the observed interdistrict variation is a product of time,
then this study paints a graver picture of how employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs fare in federal court. This modest study cannot put
these questions to rest, but it may suggest some of the sources of in-
terdistrict variation in the settlement rate for employment discrimina-
tion cases and highlight the importance of continuing and sustained
investigation.
101 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
12712011]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:12471272
